EVILgelical: an analysis of a false conversion based on Schopenhauer
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| O desesperado, de Gustave Coubert |
This text will discuss a murderer who converted to evangelical Christianity and became a preacher of a rather famous, not to say infamous, church, even though he demonstrated on several occasions that he was a liar and a charlatan. I will not mention his name, but he is well-known because of the crime he committed in the early 1990s. I was still a child when it happened. It was widely publicized and caused a commotion at the time. He died a few years ago. I will use his bad example to discuss Schopenhauer's theory of the pangs of conscience or remorse, how Schopenhauer differentiates remorse from regret or repentance, and finally, I will discuss the quieting of the will as the ultimate expression of the remorse, even though one can arrive at the negation of the will by means other than remorse or other types of personal suffering. This text is not an attack on evangelical Christianity, nor on Protestantism in general. Moreover, although Schopenhauer harshly criticized Protestantism for the complete abandonment of asceticism promoted by the vast majority of Reformed churches, he also praised it, especially for the concept of grace emphasized by Protestants, since he saw in this ancient Christian concept, restored by the Protestant Reformation, a kind of philosophical truth.
And what was that truth? Well, to get to that, I first need to talk a little about how the cosmic will gives rise to intelligible characters in Schopenhauer's philosophy.
Our world is the world of representations, of subject and object. This world, however, is the objectification of a single blind and insatiable will. For Schopenhauer, there is a metaphysical cosmic will behind everything. From the primordial forces of nature, such as gravity, to the most complex forms of life, the world as representation is nothing more than the will objectifying itself from the simplest and most universal degrees, such as the forces of physics, to more complex and particular degrees, such as complex animals, especially human beings. The will objectifies itself immediately in universal archetypes, which, for Schopenhauer, are Platonic ideas, and indirectly in particular things, subject to the principle of sufficient reason, things with which we have contact, including ourselves as empirical subjects. This, however, is not a process that occurs in time. It is an ontological ordering, so to speak, although in the end everything is will.
The will did not first exist in time and then proceeded to produce the ideas that, subsequently, produced the individual things of our world. For Schopenhauer, time and space are a priori forms of our sensibility, while causality is the a priori form of our understanding, which transforms the sensory data we passively receive through our senses into an object with cause and effect. The empirical intuition we have of the external world is the result of this synthesis. Therefore, time and space, that which differentiates things, only exist in the world as representation, not in the world as will, which is undifferentiated, one, and subsists eternally outside the a priori forms of our understanding.
Human beings represent the highest degree of objectification of the will. Therefore, each human possesses an intelligible character, a Platonic idea that corresponds to that human. See, everything in nature has an intelligible character, something that defines what that thing is and how it will behave given the causal conditions in which it is embedded in the world as a representation. This is something Schopenhauer establishes in § 28 of Book II of The World as Will and Representation. Let's look at the following example taken from the introduction of David Cartwright's translation of The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics: water boils at 100 degrees Celsius, falls when thrown from a height on a waterfall, and remains stable when in a receptacle. Water has a character that responds in a certain way to these different situations. Similarly, the innate character of each person will respond in a certain way when confronted with a particular causal chain. Given our innate nature, we are led to act in such and such a way, based on different motivations, and the way humans respond to different motivations is more complex than the way inorganic natural phenomena behave, precisely because we humans each have an intelligible character that is uniquely ours.
With a liquid or a gas, knowing its physical and chemical relationships is enough to understand how it will manifest in the world as a representation in this or that situation. In the case of humans, although they are also subject to perfectly natural types of causality, this is not the case. In general, our innate characters are driven by three moral impulses: the selfish, the malevolent, and the compassionate, as Schopenhauer makes explicit in § 20 of his work On the Basis of Morality, titled On the Ethical Difference of Characters. It is rare to find people who are entirely malevolent or entirely compassionate. Egoism, however, is the main factor found in all of us, because all phenomena of the will always aim to assert themselves. Everything wants to assert itself, seizing matter in a given place and at a given moment, because everything has as its essence the same insatiable cosmic will. A particular phenomenon only fails to win and seize everything because it is confronted by countless other phenomena that dispute reality with it. In the case of life, there is still the impossibility of an individual phenomenon remaining for much longer, given that a living being is ephemeral and exists only to sustain the species, dying quickly. Even beings that live for centuries or millennia, such as certain types of turtles and trees, are ephemeral compared to inorganic nature and the more general phenomena of will, the forces of physics.
The vast majority of phenomena, however, lack consciousness, and among those phenomena that do have consciousness, only humans have reason, that is, the capacity to formulate abstract representations from the data provided by the faculty of understanding. While other animals also possess understanding, while they receive sensory data and organize it causally, other animals are incapable of reflecting abstractly, of creating concepts, including abstract representations of the past, present, and future. This is why Schopenhauer, and not only him, says that animals live in an eternal present. This doesn't mean they lack memory, not at all. But their memory is instinctual, not made up by complex, abstract concepts. These abstract concepts do not necessarily correspond to empirical reality, though. They may very well be pure fantasy. But they are abstractions nonetheless. This is where Kant's critique of pure reason comes in: pure reason, without the reins of empirical reality, is capable of creating perfectly logical monsters, but which have no correspondence with the real world, such as God, for example.
In any case, it is in humans that the three moral impulses defined by Schopenhauer in On the Basis of Morality are defined as such. It is only in humans that they truly become selfishness, malice, and compassion, because it is only in humans that there is the awakening of a profound and rational consciousness; it is in them that the will becomes the will to knowledge. They no longer do things blindly and almost completely subjugated to their will, like the character of their species, such as a lion that devours its prey. No, when humans kill, they know that they are causing suffering to another.
To recap what I've said so far in a poetic or metaphorical way: imagine the cosmic will as a vast ocean. This ocean produces gigantic waves, and within these gigantic waves, there are other, successively smaller waves within each other. The larger waves are the objectifications of the will at lower and more general levels, such as gravity and impenetrability, while the other waves, increasingly smaller, would be objectifications at higher and more particular levels. At a given moment, an objectification arises that awakens: the first pair of eyes, a primitive being, which begins to represent the world in its cognitive apparatus. This world, which was previously pure will, is now represented. It is now the world as representation. Time, space, and causality come into existence; something that, for Schopenhauer, is an antinomy, but here I will treat it as Philipp MainlÀnder does: mathematical time and space arise as representation, yes, but succession and extension are attributes of the thing-in-itself, of the will, which is why all this history prior to the first pair of eyes is possible.
Then, smaller, more particular waves emerge, which are the intelligible characteristics of humans. These intelligible characteristics are still Platonic ideas, but the empirical subjects to whom these waves originate are their pairs of eyes in the world as representation, and they are subordinate to their intelligible character — our empirical character, the one we discover throughout life through our actions, is immutable.
For Schopenhauer, this is why, although we might even imagine a political utopia that solves issues like security — a place where no one kills anyone and where everyone feels safe — such a state would only be shaping the empirical character of people, which, in most cases, is marked by selfishness, while in a few cases it is marked by malice, that is, by the will to cause suffering even if the wrongdoer harms himself in the process, and in even fewer cases it is marked by compassion, that is, by the genuine desire to help others who suffer. This political utopia would be great, of course, but it would not be able to alter the innate character of people, according to Schopenhauer. It would only be effective in dealing with such character types in such a way that they understand that the best thing for themselves is not to kill, not to hurt others, etc. This happens because, as Schopenhauer writes in § 66 of Book IV of The World as Will and Representation:
no genuine virtue can be brought about through morality and abstract knowledge in general, but that such virtue must spring from the intuitive knowledge that recognizes in another’s individuality the same inner nature as in one’s own.For virtue does indeed result from knowledge, but not from abstract knowledge communicable through words. If this were so, virtue could be taught, and by expressing here in the abstract its real nature and the knowledge at its foundation, we should have ethically improved everyone who comprehended this.
However, although nothing can alter the innate intelligible character of people, intimate knowledge — and here I am not speaking of abstract knowledge, but of intuitive knowledge that reaches the core of our being — is indeed capable of silencing the will, to a greater or lesser degree, making some people truly more just, others more charitable and compassionate, and, in a few cases, causing the individual to seek the complete negation of the will itself, becoming an ascetic. This does not occur because the intelligible character has been altered, but because the will has been suppressed to a greater or lesser degree; and, since the will is the insatiable source of self-affirmation, this silencing translates as a greater or lesser seeing through of the principle of individuation, that is, it translates into good works, such as justice, charity, compassion, etc, depending on the degree to which it is silenced. Schopenhauer, in a letter exchanged with a disciple towards the end of his life, states that there is no such thing as degrees of silencing, but rather that these things are preparations that may or may not result in the ascetic silencing of the will. But the fact is that the text of The World as Will and Representation does indeed speak of degrees or grades of denial of the will.
In Book IV of The World as Will and Representation, in §§ 65, 66, 67, and 68, almost at the end of the work, before the appendix in which he criticizes Kantian philosophy, Schopenhauer writes about different degrees of good, that is, about the different degrees to which we are able to see beyond the principle of individuation that turns a single will into separate beings who seek to assert themselves at any cost. At a simpler level, seeing beyond the principle of individuation is being just, that is, not denying the will of the other by asserting one's own will over the other. At a higher level, seeing beyond the principle of individuation is being charitable, actively seeking to help the other in their suffering, satisfying the will of others. Finally, at its highest level, there is asceticism, the renunciation of the will within oneself, because the individual comes to feel all the pain of the world within oneself and realizes that this existence is beyond any salvation. It is important to note that it is not as if the ascetic needs to go through all the previous degrees, or that the righteous person will later walk towards asceticism in their life. In fact, a person can be righteous from the beginning, already possessing this innate character. The malevolent person can also be malicious from the beginning to the end of their life, without ever changing, except perhaps by restricting their actions because they know that being evil all the time would be detrimental to them.
But seeing beyond the principle of individuation is not merely an alteration in empirical character aimed at better adapting to life's circumstances. This is an intimate, not merely intellectual knowledge that, to a lesser or greater degree, produces an alteration in the person themselves, which, although unable to alter their intelligible character, is capable of negating it, even if not completely, as in the case of the ascetic, who completely denies the will within themselves. Even the most wicked person can experience what Schopenhauer defines as a weight or pang of conscience, which may or may not lead them to want to deny the will. As he writes in § 65:
However densely the veil of Maya envelops the mind of the bad person, in other words, however firmly involved he is in the principium individuationis, according to which he regards his person as absolutely different from every other and separated from it by a wide gulf, a knowledge to which he adheres with all his might, since it alone suits and supports his egoism, so that knowledge is almost always corrupted by the will, there is nevertheless roused in the innermost depths of his consciousness the secret presentiment that such an order of things is only phenomenon, but that, in themselves, things are quite different[...]In the strength with which the wicked person affirms life, and which is exhibited to him in the suffering he perpetrates on others, he estimates how far he is from the surrender and denial of that very will, from the only possible deliverance from the world and its miseries. He sees to what extent he belongs to the world, and how firmly he is bound to it. The known suffering of others has not been able to move him; he is given up to life and to felt or experienced suffering. It remains doubtful whether this will ever break and overcome the vehemence of his will.
Speaking specifically about the negation of the will that produces the ascetic, which can indeed occur due to the remorse a person feels for their bad actions — a situation that figures in the path of personal suffering — we can also arrive at the negation of the will through love for one's neighbor, although Schopenhauer affirms that the path of personal suffering, whatever it may be, is the most common of the two. While remorse is the pain over the knowledge of our self being the same as that of the one we have hurt, even in a rudimentary and obscure way, repentance or regret is an alteration in the knowledge that led to a past action. According to Schopenhauer, we never regret what we wanted when we committed an act, because we always want what our intelligible character desires. We only regret what we did: if we committed an act more selfish or malicious than our intelligible character because, at that time, we were led by erroneous knowledge to do so, we can regret it and wish that we had not done it. But the opposite is also possible: if we are led to act more compassionately when our intelligible character demands that we be more selfish or malicious, we can also regret it. Therefore, there can be regret even for not having acted worse or more maliciously.
Remorse, or a guilty conscience, is not like that. It always arises from an intimate, intuitive recognition of having harmed another, who in essence is the same as the one who harmed them, since separation only exists in the world as a representation, even if this recognition occurs to a low degree and is insufficient to silence the person's will, making them more just, compassionate, or even ascetic. A person may not fully see through the principle of individuation for their conscience to be tormented by a past act. They don't even need to be fully aware of it; as I said, it's something that can appear obscurely in the recesses of their consciousness. In both cases, both regret and remorse, it's important to emphasize again that there is no alteration in the intelligible character, which is an original act of the cosmic will and therefore innate to each individual. However, in the case of remorse, an inner change may arise that causes the person to seek, even if not completely, to silence their will — that will which they now know, to a greater or lesser degree, to be a source of suffering for others and for themselves. It is, in reality, that person's own will turning against itself.
This intuitive knowledge, which at its highest level gives rise to the ascetic negation of the will, cannot be taught; it comes as if from outside, even though the subject needs to feel it upon coming into contact with the world. It is here that Schopenhauer introduces the concept of Christian grace, emphasized over good works by Saint Augustine and, centuries later, by Luther during the Protestant Reformation. For Augustine and Luther, good works were the fruit of a prior divine grace. Good works were also the fruit of grace for Schopenhauer, although Schopenhauer also makes it clear it isn't something that comes from God in an extensive footnote in § 70 of The World..., where, despite his praise for Augustine, he points out that Augustine's contradictions exist precisely because he attempts to defend an omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent God as the creator and sustainer of the world. For Schopenhauer, we are all essentially the cosmic will — even though we have different intelligible characteristics, they are all will, and we are all guilty of what we are, even though we are confined to the necessity of causality in the world as representation, this empirical world of spatio-temporal plurality. From a metaphysical point of view, we create ourselves, blindly and inadvertently, without knowing that we would be creating a world so full of suffering. Therefore, Schopenhauer believes that we are guilty of what we do and what we are. I will discuss this further in a future text, but in short, I can agree with the first statement, but I disagree with the second.
In any case, for him, we are perfectly determined in this world: there is no free will. We have will, but it is conditioned by our intelligible character, which exists outside the a priori forms of our understanding and precedes our own material existence. There is no God, much less a benevolent and omniscient God. We are responsible for our own creation in a metaphysical sense, but also responsible for grace, as he states in the same footnote.
Yes, there was a kind of fall, like in the myth of Adam and Eve's expulsion from Eden, but for Schopenhauer, this myth represents the guilt of the cosmic will having objectified itself in the empirical world, including our individual guilt, which resides in our intelligible character, which is a priori to the world. Furthermore, on this point, he states that the duty of state justice should never be merely to punish a past act. Punishment should serve as an example for the future; otherwise, justice would be basically the same as revenge, which, for him, is a selfish affirmation of the will, not very different from torture or murder. It's funny that, for many conservatives who constantly criticize my texts and talks, this is complete nonsense, something for progressives, leftists, etc, and Schopenhauer is a mere reactionary like them. But they haven't read Schopenhauer. Regardless of the punishment, whether it's imprisonment or the death penalty, the function should always be to prevent future crimes, in Schopenhauer's view; otherwise, it is not justice. He makes this perfectly clear in Book IV of The World as Will and Representation, in § 62, for anyone curious enough to read it.
To quickly recap: 1) the metaphysical cosmic will objectifies itself to varying degrees throughout nature, from the forces of physics to human beings; 2) in human beings, this objectification is more refined; we are all different, both in appearance and character, although there are patterns that place us on one side or the other: some will be more compassionate, others more selfish, and still others more evil; 3) although our empirical character is totally determined, since the natural world is entirely governed by cause and effect, our intelligible character, which is an original act of the metaphysical will and exists outside of time and space, is free; therefore, although our actions in the world as representation are determined, our character in the world as will is responsible for our empirical character; 4) remorse is the pain in the conscience that comes from the recognition, however obscure and rudimentary, that although we are separate phenomena, our innermost essence, the thing-in-itself, is the same will, which hurts and is hurt, which devours and is devoured; 5) intuitive, intimate knowledge, which transcends the principle of individuation that separates phenomena in the world as representation, is capable of making an individual just, compassionate, or ascetic, because their will can be silenced to a greater or lesser degree.
Having gone through all of that, I can now speak very briefly about the false conversion of that murderer. In his work, Schopenhauer cites concrete and generic examples of selfish adventurers and evildoers who, when confronted with a situation, be it their own execution, their own suffering, or the suffering of another person, were able to see beyond the principle of individuation completely and embrace some greater or lesser degree of asceticism, that is, some degree of denial of the will. The murderer I am talking about stabbed a coworker to death. He had the help of his then-wife. He served a ridiculously short sentence for the heinousness of the crime and afterwards became an evangelical preacher who is politically conservative, even participating in marches in favor of a military coup. The church he joined is a neo-Pentecostal church that preaches the prosperity gospel. This church is completely alien to any ascetic principle of Christianity, a principle that was already present in the four Gospels, as well as the Pauline epistles. The perpetrator, at least publicly, always tried to blame the victim and hidden forces that led him to commit the crime.
From all indications, he, at most, regretted not having committed the crime more effectively, leaving fewer traces so as not to be caught. Perhaps he regretted committing the crime itself, not because he didn't secretly desire it, but because he eventually understood that it harmed his career, his life, and his finances, finances that he was certainly able to stabilize when he became a preacher of a prosperity church. Therefore, his situation would only involve things related to the world as representation, nothing that transcended differentiation, nothing that made him look beyond the principle of individuation and touched him deeply. There was zero remorse, which is the pang of conscience indicative of having, even to a minuscule degree, some ability to see through the principle of individuation. There would be regret, at most, and for purely selfish reasons, but not remorse, which indicates the capacity, however obscure, to see beyond individuated phenomena. If he had truly been tormented in his conscience, if he had fully seen beyond the principle of individuation, he would have become a hermit, entered some monastery — although they wouldn't accept him nowadays, of course — and not sought personal gain from his imprisonment, writing a book absolving himself of guilt and fantasizing about murder.
Look, Schopenhauer doesn't address conversion in relation to a religion itself, in terms of its myths and dogmatic content. That's irrelevant. What's important is the capacity to see through the principle of individuation to some degree and, at the highest level, to be able to completely deny the will itself, becoming a complete ascetic, even willing to die of starvation, since one no longer has the will to maintain one's own body, as occurs in Jainism, a religion that arose at the same historical moment as Buddhism, being one of the heterodox currents of Dharmic religions that have survived to this day. This is why Schopenhauer so harshly criticizes religions that, in principle, are against asceticism, such as Protestantism, Judaism, and Islam, although he acknowledges that even within these, there are ascetic currents, generally within mystical groups, as occurred, for example, among the Shakers in the United States, and as occurs among Kabbalists in Judaism and Sufis in Islam, although even among these, complete celibacy and aversion to reproduction are not encouraged, as was the case with the Shakers, and as is the case in various currents of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Catholicism, Orthodox and Eastern Christianity.
As Schopenhauer writes in § 68:
it is a matter of complete indifference by what myths and dogmas they account to their faculty of reason for this intuitive and immediate knowledge, and for their conversion.
Reason can invent myths and dogmas, but true conversion is only that which traverses the principle of individuation to some degree, negating the will in partial and temporary forms, or in an absolute manner.
by Fernando Olszewski
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